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Post-neoliberalism in Europe? How economic discourses have 
changed through COVID-19 pandemic  




La pandemia di COVID-19 sta influenzando le società contemporanee in mo-
di complessi ed eterogenee. Questo lavoro si focalizza sull’economia, analiz-
zando le trasformazioni causate dalla crisi pandemica nei discorsi degli esperti 
economici europei. Il contributo prende le mosse dalla teoria foucaultiana del 
dispositivo e distingue quattro livelli attraverso i quali il neoliberismo – sfrut-
tando il sistema UE – ha influenzato le società europee negli ultimi decenni: 
mondo economico, istituzioni, policy network e discorsi. L’interazione tra i 
quattro livelli sarà analizzata e discussa a partire dall’analisi empirica del livel-
lo discorsivo. Prendendo come casi di studio i Country Report del Semestre 
Europeo 2020 e le Raccomandazioni UE sull’Italia, verranno individuate tre 
caratteristiche del discorso neoliberista dell’UE: temporalità discorsiva, auto-
rità discorsiva ed ethos discorsivo. L’analisi discorsiva comparata di due do-
cumenti pubblicati tra i mesi di marzo e maggio 2020 mostrerà come lo shock 
esogeno causato dal Corona Virus abbia drasticamente cambiato il discorso 
degli esperti economici neoliberisti dell’UE. L’articolo prospetta la nascita di 
una “nuova normalità” nella sfera politica e politico-economica; un “nuova 
normalità” che potrebbe influenzare le prospettive future dei Paesi europei.  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is influencing contemporary societies in complex 
and multiple ways. This paper focuses on the economy via an analysis of the 
transformations of European economic expert discourses brought about by 
the corona crisis in 2020. The contribution starts form Foucault’s theory of 
dispositif and distinguishes four levels on which neoliberalism was influenc-
ing European societies via the EU system in the last decades: the world econ-
omy, institutions, policy networks and discourses. While focussing empirical-
                                                 





ly on the discursive level, the interplay of all four levels is discussed and in-
vestigated. Taking the example of the European Semester 2020 “Country Re-
ports” and “EU Recommendations” on Italy as case study, three features of 
these documents characterising EU neoliberal discourse are elaborated: dis-
cursive temporality, discursive authority and discursive ethos. A comparative 
discourse analysis of two documents published between March 2020 and May 
2020 shows that corona as external shock has changed EU neoliberal econom-
ic expert discourse dramatically. The paper argues that a post-neoliberal “new 
normality” in the realm of economic policy and politics is emerging that 





When Michel Foucault introduced the idea of economic governmentality, 
the social sciences received a strong analytical tool for analysing the discur-
sive power of economic ideas from a discourse analytical viewpoint2. This was 
probably one of the most important innovations to further develop Marxist 
analysis of cultural production after Gramsci, Althusser and Lacan3. While 
institutionalist approaches influenced by Max Weber’s sociology of social ac-
tion typically focus on clear-cut ideas, strategically acting players and coher-
ent institutional settings4, discourse analytical approaches following Foucault 
take into account the opacity and contextuality of symbolic forms as well as 
                                                 
2 Cfr. M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collége de France, 1978-1979, Pal-
grave Macmillan, New York 2008. 
3  Cfr. J. Maesse and G. Nicoletta, Economics as Ideological Discourse Practice: A Gramsci-
Foucault-Lacan Approach to Analysing Power/Knowledge Regimes of Subjectivation, in «Journal 
of Multicultural Discourses», 2021; Y. Stavrakakis, Dispatches from the Greek Lab: Metaphors, 
Strategies and Debt in the European Crisis, in «Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society» 18(3), 2013, 
pp. 313–324; N-L. Sum and B. Jessop, Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in 
Its Place in Political Economy, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2013. 
4 Cfr. P. A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1989; P. A. Hall, Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro Cri-
sis, in «West European Politics» 37(6), 2014, pp. 1223–1243. 
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the hidden power structures at work in language use5. Especially the govern-
mentality studies pointed to the way economic thinking is influencing entire 
societies6. In last years, the social studies of economics complemented this ap-
proach by focussing on the performative role of economics as a political tool 
for intervening into complex societies7. 
Such a view on discourse and economics as instrument of power is particu-
larly helpful to understand ongoing transformations of and within the Europe-
an Union taking place after the Euro crisis (since 2009) and during the 
COVID19 pandemic (since 2020). While neoliberal economic expert discourses 
influenced European countries since the 1970s in manifold ways, in the last 
years neoliberalism reached an impasse and came under political, economic and 
cultural pressure: neoliberal solutions and receipts can no longer convince peo-
ple, governments and experts, especially in times of crisis evoked by “external 
shocks”. While the Euro crisis in 2009 has only gradually questioned neoliber-
alism, the economic, medical, cultural, psychological and political consequences 
of COVID19 crisis since March 2020 has removed neoliberal ideas from public, 
political and administrative discourses – at least for the moment. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the discursive structures of the current 
post-neoliberal transformation process. Section 1 will briefly outline different 
levels of neoliberal influence. It will be explained how and why this paper 
makes a discourse analysis of EU economic policy papers. Section 2 makes a 
discourse analysis of the European semester, taking the EU “Country Reports” 
(published in March 2020) on Italy as a case study. Here, three features of the 
EU discourse structures of neoliberal normality are sketched out: a categorisa-
tion system constructed by discursive temporality, two competing discursive 
                                                 
5 Cfr. J. Angermuller, D. Maingueneau and R. Wodak (eds.), The Discourse Studies Reader: Main 
Currents in Theory and Analysis, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam 2014. 
6 Cfr. G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentali-
ty. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991. 
7 Cfr. I. Boldyrev and E. Svetlova (eds.), Enacting Dismal Science: New Perspectives on the Per-
formativity of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York 2016; M. Callon, Y. Millo 
and F. Muniesa (eds.), Market Devices, Blackwell, Malden, Oxford and Carlton 2007; J. Maesse, S. 
Pühringer, T. Rossier and P. Benz (eds.), Power and Influence of Economists: Contributions to 





authorities and the ethos of technocracy. Section 3 conducts a discourse anal-
ysis of the “Council Recommendation” for Italy (published end of May 2020). 
It will be shown how the discursive structures changed, removing central 
traits of neoliberal normality discourse and establishing a new structure of 
“crisis discourse”. The Conclusion summarizes main results and discusses 
what it could imply to experience a post-neoliberal “new normality” in Eu-
rope. While neoliberalism seems to disappear on the discursive and institu-
tional level through the corona shock, on the economic level the corona crisis 
is obviously deepening already existing inequalities and power asymmetries.  
 
 
1. Approach: analysing neoliberal impacts in society  
 
Neoliberalism has influenced global societies in different ways. Especially 
since the 1970s, these impacts unfold from various institutions such as IMF 
and World Bank8, through different channels such as finance and politics9, 
pushed forward by leading hegemonic countries such as UK, USA and Ger-
many and propagated by economic experts and liberal-conservative politi-
cians10. A brief look on how neoliberal ideas influenced different countries11 
quickly shows that “the” neoliberalism does not exist. The impacts, intensities 
and scope of neoliberal reforms changed from period to period, from sector to 
sector and from country to country. Whereas the UK and USA as well as 
many countries in Latin America experienced extensive deregulations, privat-
isations, financialisations, industrial outsourcings, tax cuts, and a further drift-
                                                 
8 Cfr. R. Felder, From Bretton Woods to Neoliberal Reforms: The International Financial Institu-
tions and American Power, L. Pantich and M. Konigs (eds), American empire and the political 
economy of global finance, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2008, pp. 175–197.  
9 Cfr. M. Konings, American Finance and Empire in Historical Perspective, L. Pantich and M. 
Konings (eds.), American empire and the political economy of global finance, Palgrave Macmil-
lan, London 2009, pp. 48–68. 
10 Cfr. G. A. Epstein, Financialization and the World Economy, Edward Elgar Publishing, Chel-
tenham and Northampton 2005. 
11 Cfr. P. A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1989. 
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ing apart of high and low income levels from the 1970s onwards12, many Eu-
ropean countries faced a more or less “scattered” neoliberalism13. Some coun-
tries experienced a welfare state cuts, a decrease in wages, high-income-taxes, 
privatisation of state industries, phases of more and less intensive austerity 
and privatisation14. Other countries had only few and gradual neoliberal re-
forms while constantly suffering no fiscal policy in times of shrinking GDP 
growth and high unemployment, currency turbulences and declining state 
revenues. Yet, the resistance against neoliberal measures from time to time 
successfully stopped and reversed neoliberal reform initiatives in many Euro-
pean countries and regions.  
After almost 40 years of uncoordinated neoliberal measures worldwide, 
the austerity programmes implemented during the Euro crisis until 2015 in 
different countries of the European south were probably the last “big wave” 
of neoliberal policy. Today, the results of decade-long neoliberal politics are 
manifold and they impact the capacities of all European countries to fight the 
economic, political, cultural and medical consequences of the corona crisis in 
a an alarming way. At the same time, more and more indicators made visible 
the deep crisis of neoliberalism: on the mental and health level, more and 
more people suffering the pressures of flexicurity, financialisation, austerity 
and precarity; on the economic level, all countries were enforced to respond 
to the world financial crisis in 2009 through measures that were no longer 
compatible with neoliberal dogmas; and on the political level, almost all par-
ties (mainly from the centre right and centre left) who implemented neolib-
eral reforms lost support in elections, with dramatic consequences for the po-
litical culture in many countries and regions. 
In order grasp the current changes in economic policy, we need a more 
complex model that helps us to understand the different levels on which ne-
                                                 
12 Cfr. R. Martin, Financialization of Daily Life, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA 2002. 
13 Cfr. J. Jäger and E. Springler (eds.), Asymmetric Crisis in Europe and Possible Futures: Critical 
Political Economy and Post-Keynesian Perspectives, Routledge, London and New York 2015; S. 
Lehndorff, Die Spaltende Integration Europas Ein Überblick, S. Lehndorff (ed.), Der Triumph 
gescheiterter Ideen in Europa – revisited Zehn Länderstudien, VSA, Hamburg 2014, pp. 7–39. 
14 Cfr. H. J. Bieling and D. Buhr, Europäische Welten in Der Krise: Arbeitsbeziehungen Und 





oliberalism operates. From a dispositif analytical view15, neoliberal impacts 
should be analysed on different but interrelated levels in order to grasp the 
diversities, resistances, path dependencies and non-synchronicities of politi-
co-economic transformations16. To illustrate this diversity, four different lev-
els of neoliberal influence will briefly be distinguished (see Table 1), forming 
the contemporary battlefield over politico-economic development trends.  
Frist, the European economy evolved in the last decades more and more 
according to a “centre, semi-periphery, periphery structure”17 with high-tech, 
high-income and economically powerful regions representing the centre, a 
broad semi-periphery acting as economic supplier to the centres, and a de-
coupled periphery with low income and low developmental opportunities. 
Here, socio-economic class divisions between bourgeois classes, middle clas-
ses, working classes and precarious classes obtain on a geographical form 
through an unequal geo-economic distribution of jobs, income opportunities, 
qualifications, industries, services and investments across European regions18. 
In this geo-economic structure, neoliberal initiatives influenced people’s live 
and future opportunities in a completely different way, producing economic 
profiteers and losers, forming dense urban bourgeois milieus, new petit-
bourgeoisie/post-industrial proletariat coalitions as well as a precarious classes 
on the other side, with high taxation areas in the north-west of Europe and 
neoliberal low-tax states especially in the central-eastern countries of the EU. 
                                                 
15 Cfr. M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, Pan-
theon, New York 1980; J. Maesse, The Euro Crisis Dispositif: Heterogeneous Positioning Strate-
gies in Polycentric Fields, C. Schmidt-Wellenburg and S. Bernhard (eds.), Charting transnational 
fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge, Routledge, London 2020b. 
16 Cfr. B. Jessop, The World Market, Variegated Capitalism, and the Crisis of European Integra-
tion, P. Nousios, H. Overbeek, and A. Tsolakis (eds.), Globalisation and European integration: 
critical approaches to regional order and international relations, Routledge, London and New 
York 2012, pp. 91–111. 
17 Cfr. J. Maesse, The Discursive Political Economy of Europe: Hybrid Formation of Nationalist 
Populism through Economics, in DiscourseNet Collaborative WorkingPaper Series, 3, 2020a. 
18 Cfr. European Union, Eurostat Regional Yearbook, 2018 Edition, Luxembourg 2018; R. C. Pau-
li, Boomstädte Und Schrumpfregionen: Das Auseinanderdriften Der Regionen Und Das Versagen 
Der Regionalpolitik in Der Eurozone,120, München 2020. 
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Next to this hierarchical “world economy”19 structure, political and eco-
nomic institutions represent a second level of the neoliberal dispositif influ-
encing European societies. Among the most important institutions, the Maas-
tricht regime (EU accession criteria, Stability and Growth Pact, European 
Semester, Midterm Budgetary Framework etc.) emerged as an institution to 
enforce financial discipline in EU countries20. Especially liberal-conservatives 
and “third way” social democratic parties used this institutional instrument as 
political “lever” to implement welfare cuts, layoffs, privatisations and other 
measures associated with neoliberalism since the 1990s. In addition to that, 
new institutions emerged supported the implementation of neoliberal reforms 
on the national level such as the financial rescue mechanism after the Euro 
crisis 2009 (EFSF, ESM, Memorandum). In contrast to US and UK neoliberal-
ism, which were both connected to more or less national institutions, neolib-
eral reform initiatives in EU countries were mostly connected to European 
institutions interacting with national governments in order to delegate the 
moral and political responsibility for neoliberal reforms from the national 
level to the EU level21. 
A third level of neoliberal impact can be found on the level of expert net-
works. As network analyses have shown, neoliberal economists became or-
ganised via transnational and trans-academic networks since the end of 
World War II22 (Mirowski and Plehwe 2015). The impact via networks takes 
place on the level of knowledge lobbying between universities, media, poli-
tics and related organisations. Here, not only discursive argumentations play a 
                                                 
19 The notion “world economy” does not mean that an economy is covering the entire world. It 
rather means that economic activities are related to world trade. Cfr. F. Braudel, Civilization and 
Capitalism 15th–18th Century, 1: The Structures of Everyday Life, 2: The Wheels of Commerce. 
3: The Perspective of the World, Harper Collins, New York 1985. 
20 Cfr. O. Costantini, Political Economy of the Stability and Growth Pact, in «European Journal of 
Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention» , 14, pp. 333–350, 2017. 
21 Cfr. A. Moravcsik, Warum Die Europäische Union Die Exekutive Stärkt: Innenpolitik Und In-
ternationale Kooperation, K. D. Wolf. (ed.), Projekt Europa im Wandel, Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 
211–269. 
22 Cfr. P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal 





major role23 (Fitzgerald and O’Rourke 2016; Pühringer and Hirte 2015), also 
complex connections between economists constituted over generations exer-
cise an on-going influence over economic policy ideas24 (Ötsch et al. 2017). 
Through intensive empirical work, network analyses show how neoliberal 
ideas circulate across different institutions between politics, the media and 
academia and remain relatively constant over time. The strength of these 
studies is to show how neoliberalism as a certain style of thinking was institu-
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Table 1: Levels of neoliberal dispositif 
                                                 
23 Cfr. J. K. Fitzgerald and B. K. O’Rourke, Legitimising Expertise: Analysing the Legitimation 
Strategies Used by Economics Experts in Broadcast Interviews, in «Journal of Multicultural Dis-
courses» 11 (3), 2016, pp. 269–82. 
S. Pühringer and K. Hirte, ‘The Financial Crisis as a Heart Attack: Discourse Profiles of Econo-
mists in the Financial Crisis’, in «Journal of Language and Politics», 14 (4), 2015, pp. 599–625. 
24 Cfr. W. O. Ötsch, S. Pühringer and K. Hirte, Netzwerke Des Marktes: Ordoliberalismus Als 
Politische Ökonomie, Springer, Berlin 2017. 
 




Finally, neoliberalism also operates on the formal-discursive level. This level 
regulates interpretation processes taking place within a discursive political econ-
omy at the interface of various fields such as science, politics, media and the 
economy25 (Maesse 2015). Discourses are not identical with ideas, and they can-
not be detached from institutions and the world economy. Yet, the way discours-
es promote neoliberal influences differ because discursive structures don't explain 
which ideas circulate, they rather explain how ideas – manifested in policy doc-
uments and other texts – can be interpreted. This paper argues that three types of 
discursive structures are fundamental for making economic expert discourses a 
political tool: temporality, authority and ethos/subjectivity. 
a) Discursive temporality: discourses always create a “here” and “now” po-
sition. This is important to understand how the speaker of a discourse locates 
their point of view in the enunciated historical time (which is, of course, a discur-
sive construction and must not be confused to “historical” time or GMT). In eco-
nomic expert discourses, historical temporally is a strategic resource for evaluat-
ing the past, criticising the government/opposition and presenting a policy pro-
gramme for the future. In such deictic positionings, images of “good” and “bad”, 
“successful” and “failed” actors in politics are created. As we will see in the next 
section, discursive temporality creates in EU economic policy discourses a hori-
zontal and vertical “space of valuation”. 
b) Discursive authority: in discourses speaker always act in the name of 
particular authorities. Here, I use Lacan’s idea of the “big Other” which is a dis-
cursive figure that can provide actors with different forms of legitimacy. Legiti-
macy, authority and other forms of status are relevant strategies in political dis-
course to anchor justifications within the socio-symbolic universe. Economic ide-
as are always presented in the name of somebody else, especially in democratic 
discourses. As we will see in the next sections, these discursive authorities nor-
malise and naturalise economic ideas through “implicitness”. 
c) Discursive ethos/subjectivity: discourses always operate with forms of 
subjectivity. This is important for understanding ethos as a modality that makes 
                                                 
25 Cfr. J. Maesse, Economic Experts: A Discursive Political Economy of Economics, in «Journal of 





the subjectivity of politics and expertise accessible to diverse audiences. Ethos or 
subjectivity supports the relationship of the speaker to the symbolic authorities 
and it helps to make the “here and now” position plausible to the audiences. In 
the next sections, we will see how the “technocracy” ethos of EU economic policy 
documents changes through the appearance of “corona crisis”. 
In the following sections I will show how EU economic policy discourse op-
erates. The main institution is the so called “European semester”. The European 
semester was introduced in 2011 and it combines macroeconomic analysis with 
budgetary planning. It consist of four steps: in January, the EU commission pre-
sents an annual economic growth report (“Annual Growth Survey”) for the entire 
EU; in March, the European Council agrees on the main measures to be taken; 
until April, all member states present their “stability and convergence pro-
grammes” (as a report) for their annual budgets; these are the basis for the coun-
try specific reports (“Country Report”) made by the EU commission and agreed 
by the ECOFIN (Council of all EU finance ministers); in July, the Council pub-
lishes country specific recommendations (“Council Recommendation”). These 
recommendations are optional for each country’s budgetary plans. Yet, since the 
European semester is part of the Stability and Growth Pact, in fact, only those 
countries which meet the so called “Maastricht criteria” (60% debt by GDP and 
3% annual debt per GDP) can afford to ignore the EU recommendations. But 
countries with a high level of public debts, and especially those facing a “deficit 
procedure”, cannot easily ignore the Country Recommendations. Therefore, EU 
economic policy documents have a slightly different impact on so called “indebt-
ed” countries that faced a deficit procedure in the recent years such as France, 
Belgium, Slovakia, Finland, Italy, Slovenia, Portugal or Spain. The main reason 
for this bizarre situation is the neoliberal tendency manifested within the EU in-
stitutions as they emerged in the 1990s: while member states can be punished for 
high levels of public debts, they cannot be forced to implement fiscal policy (pub-
lic investments) and make sure high levels of private and public consumption 
(trough public expenses and increasing wages, for example). This conflict is main-
ly manifested in an opposition between so called “northern countries” (such as 
Germany, Austria, Netherlands) and so called “southern countries” (such as 
France, Spain, Italy). 
Yet, the neoliberal tendency of the EU institutions does not automatically im-
ply that economic reports (discourses) lead to an implementation of neoliberal 
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policies in member states; nor do they determine how discursive structures of 
policy documents is designed. Rather, this entire institutionalised procedure pro-
duces a couple of economic expert reports, which have different political, admin-
istrative and institutional meanings for different EU countries. In the next two 
sections, I will analyse the discursive structure of two of these reports from 2020: 
the “Country Report Italy” from March 2020 and the “Council Recommendation” 
published end of May 2020. I take Italy as a case study because Italy is constantly 
facing a deficit procedure, and a weakening of neoliberal impacts from the EU 
would change the situation of the Italian political economy enormously. 
 
 
2. Neoliberalism in the EU: the discursive logic of the “European Semester”  
  
The “Country Report Italy” from March 2020 is a typical example of the 
discursive structure of neoliberal “normality” as it is manifested within EU 
documents. The entire document covers almost all aspects of Italy’s economy 
including topics such as work and unemployment, GDP and growth, budget, 
taxation and debts, innovation, technology and competition, climate change 
and sustainable development, gender participation, migration, inequality, in-
come and so forth. The entire report covers 91 pages and discusses many as-
pects of the Italian economy based on the prior discussions and prioritisations 
(see procedure of the European Semester). Based on small excerpts from this 
document, I will illustrate the main elements of EU document’s discourse 
structure. I analyse and present these discourse characteristics in order to 
show in the next section how the corona crisis has changed the discourse 
structure of neoliberal normality of Maastricht-EU. 
 
 
2.1. Discursive temporality: constructing a vertical and horizontal space of 
economic evaluation 
 
In a first step, I will show how “discursive temporality” is organised in EU 
economic policy documents. In the following excerpt, I have highlighted in 







Figure 1: horizontal temporality (present and future) 
 
The example is taken from the first page of the “executive summery” that 
is the starting point of the report. In Figure 1 we see how two points on the 
timeline (present and future) are realised by using the verbs in present pro-
gressive: “facing”, “lifting”, “reducing” and “unwinding”. This implies stand-
point taken by the discourse speaker in the present and watching to the fu-
ture. Here, a line is drawn where various “economic challenges” become visi-
ble (i.e. “weak macroeconomic outlook”, “productivity” etc.) and can be lo-
cated, on the timeline, at different distances from the deictic point of the 
speaker “here-and-now” (present). 
 
 
Figure 2: horizontal temporality (present and past) 
 
More interesting is how the “past” enters the discourse, as we see in Figure 
2. Here, the discourse makes a reference to the past by naming an institution-
al fact (“2019 country-specific recommendations”) and by placing an actant 
(“Italy”) to that entity in relation (“made”). What we see here is a simple but 
fundamental timeline constructed around the institution of the EU economic 
semester (“2019 country-specific recommendations”), economic “challenges” 
(present) and a future perspective (finding a solution for these challenges). 
Now, the horizontal timeline is realised and related to an institutional system. 
 
 




Figure 3: vertical temporality 
 
Subsequently, based on this “horizontal timeline”, a “vertical system” of 
categories can be constructed, as Figure 3 shows. Here, a couple of topics are 
enumerated that can be evaluated, discussed, analysed and criticised through-
out the entire report (“active labour market” etc.). This horizontal and verti-
cal system made possible by discursive temporality is the basic discourse 
structure of the EU economic normality, independent of neoliberal or social-
ist or Keynesian or whatever orientation. It is the basic structure of the EU 
economic discursive categorisation apparatus making possible to see, valuate, 
propose, reject, emphasis or criticise economic measures, policies, facts and so 
forth. Next to this basic structure, additional elements must be introduced to 
in order to transform the basic economic expert discourse into a neoliberal 
discourse structure.  
  
 
2.2. Competing authorities: “GDP” vs. “debts”  
 
A second element that typically characterises the EU neoliberal discourse 
structure is the construction of two “economic authorities” which are in con-
stant struggle. These are authorities for two reasons: first, they represent dif-
ferent social values, have different economic implications and they are differ-
ently attached to competing economic theories, and second, they impact oth-





(i.e. “if GDP growth, then unemployment declines”). Thus, throughout the 
document’s subtopics such as “unemployment”, “productivity”, “innovation”, 
“taxes”, “wages” and so forth, two entities constantly emerge which seem to 
be on overall importance for evaluating the Italian economy: “GDP” and 
“debts”. General Domestic Product (GDP) is a macroeconomic indicator for 
annual wealth production of an economic entity (in our case the national 
economy of Italy). Economic analyses assume that many other economic enti-
ties such as wages, employment rate, taxes, competitiveness and so forth direct-
ly depend on the level of GDP growth. One can say that GDP is the most im-
portant core category in standard macroeconomic analysis. On the other hand, 
“debts” usually refers to the amount of existing debts and new bonds to be is-
sued in the future in order to refinance a country’s national budget. Through 
this discursive authority, neoliberal theory enters the discursive scene because 
the debt rate is defined in the EU treaties since Maastricht and countries with a 
high indebtedness rate can become subject to “deficit procedure”.  
 
 
Figure 4: conflicting discursive authorities 
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As we see in the excerpt in Figure 4, taken from Chapter 4, page 26 of the 
report, introducing the recommended “reform priorities”, “GDP” and “debt” 
are in constant interaction. They work as authorities, “allowing” or “restrict-
ing” other categories such as income, public expenditures or taxes to unfold or 
not. More importantly, they influence each other: high GDP growth rates al-
low more public income via taxes and less expenses for welfare programmes; 
on the other hand, an increase of public debts can accelerate GDP growth. 
Thus, both categories operate in EU economic expert discourse, and, as dis-
cursive authorities, they create a field of conflict over the direction of eco-
nomic policy. Especially for countries with high indebtedness rates prefer fis-
cal measures (public investments in infrastructure, increasing wages, lower 
taxes etc.) in order to stimulate GDP growth; but due to debt limits deter-
mined by the EU treaties (Stability and Growth Pact), countries cannot raise 
money for that via government bonds in order to refinance fiscal measures. In 
the EU discourse logic, GPD and debts very often appear as rivals and not as 
entities that support each other, as the following logic explains (which can be 
seen as the “EU neoliberal discourse formula”): if your GDP growth rate is 
high, you don't need fiscal measures and therefore no additional debts; BUT: 
if your GDP growth is low, you need fiscal measures and therefore no addi-
tional debts, but you cannot because most countries with low GDP rates have 
high indebtedness rates. This “rivalry” between these two discourse authori-
ties is not naturally anchored in any economic theory and discourse. In prin-
ciple, they can act in any other constellation; they can act “in harmony” sup-
porting each other, and they can also act as “subcategories” or other “equal 
categories” and not as authorities. Yet, the EU neoliberal discourse is special 
as they act as authorities and as rivals simultaneously.  
 
 
2.3. Ethos of technocracy 
 
A third feature that characterises EU neoliberal discourse is what we can 
call the “ethos of technocracy”. In order to illustrate how discursive ethos is 
constructed by EU policy papers, we take again an excerpt from the executive 








As we see in the discourse markers highlighted by yellow colour, this 
ethos is evoked by gesture of “smart”, “cautious” and even “non-valuating” 
evaluations. These evaluations allow a speaker to appear, in the eyes of a mid-
dle class, well educated person, construct around the image of a professional 
who does not intervene into a discourse with her/his own opinion. Based on 
expertise, facts and solid methods, the EU technocrat only “reports” what is 
well justified in professionalism, science and law. Against this background, 
technocratic evaluations “reserved” and “un-emotional” but nevertheless 
“pointing” to a “respectable” degree to the “problems”, “achievements” and 
“challenges” of a member state’s economy. Thus, the ethos of technocracy al-
ways preserves a particular system of categories, maintaining the legitimacy 
of a certain style of discourse and stabilising, via the ethos, the underlying in-
stitutional system of EU governance.  
 
 
3. What has changed through corona? 
 
Whereas the “Country Report Italy” was published before the corona vi-
rus arrived Europe and Italy, the “Council Recommendation” was published 
at 20 May 2020, at a moment when the pandemic was officially recognised as 
a “crisis”. In the following analysis I will present excerpts from the “Council 
Recommendation”. Normally, the “Council Recommendation” is a regular 
part of the European Semester (see Section 1) and the economic measures 
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recommended here follow directly from the diagnosed “problems” of the Coun-
try Report were Italy was seen as “high-indebted, low GDP-growth” economy. 
This diagnosis and the subsequent recommendations are now removed. But this 
removal does not appear through the established discourse structure, embedded 
by the institutional system of the European Semester. As we will see in the dis-
courses analyses below, all discourse structures change and a new discourse ap-
paratus emerges. Yet, the collapse of the discursive structure of normality 
through crisis is not simply a collapse (as negativity and disappearance of posi-
tivity). On the contrary, the crisis management system that we will analyse be-
low has a discursive structure (as positivity) on its own.  
 
 
3.1. New temporality: how COVID has changed the deictic apparatus 
 
Here, again, we start with the first paragraph of the policy discourse. At 
first, the report starts on paragraph (1) with the standard discursive temporal-




 Figure 6: EU standard temporality 
 
Here, we see again how the discourse creates a timeline by referencing to 
the institutional apparatus of the European Semester, as indicated by the yel-
low highlighted marks. But soon, at paragraph (3), the discursive temporality 








Figure 7: COVID19 as discursive “event” 
 
In EU this economic policy report, the standard temporal structure rup-
tures evoked by two discursive markers. First, the yellow coloured dates mark 
an “event” induced by a date. This can be seen as a “bureaucratic” discourse 
marker, typical for a technical discourse. This event is not simply the moment 
when COVID-19 emerges, it is rather the indexical entity that introduces a 
new discursive as well as institutional system: now, the regular process of the 
European Semester stops, and everything said, claimed, argued, diagnosed and 
recommended via the economic categorisation system (see Section 2.1) is no 
longer valid and can be re-examined now. A completely new situation 
emerged seen as dramatic enough to suspend the heart piece of EU neoliberal 
tendency: the so called Maastricht criteria. Second, the event is obviously not 
able to explain and legitimise itself. Rather, next to the event, an institutional 
authority is named responsible for the legal validity of the “event”, marked 
with a green line. Through these discursive elements, a new temporality 
emerges with the “event” of the crisis at the centre of the deictic apparatus. 
Now, everything must be said with reference to this deictic moment: “here, 
now = the crisis”. All economic measures will now be legitimated with re-
spect to this deictic entity.  
  
 
3.2. New authority is approaching: suspending the conflict by a new “god” 
(crisis)  
 
Interestingly, the “crisis” is not only the deictic element in the EU-corona 
discourse. It becomes a new authority as well. This is best be illustrated by 
the excerpt from paragraph (13) in Figure 8.  
 
 






As we see in green colours in sentence 1 and 2, signs such as “COVID-19 
pandemic”, “pandemic”, and similar formulations are now functioning as ar-
gumentative authorities. It is fascinating to see that all measures, marked here 
in yellow colours, are directly connected to the new authority. For example, 
“wage supplementation” is not explained with a standard macroeconomic ar-
gument (namely, increasing domestic demand), it is rather seen is response to 
the pandemic. The new discursive authority operates like “super master signi-
fier”, a kind of “discursive god” that allows almost everything to appear. Al-
most all measures enumerated here (in yellow) were seen as impossible under 
the neoliberal discourse and the “debt” authority. Interestingly, even the for-
mer discursive authorities (marked blue in sentence 2 and green in the final 
sentence) are integrated as equal elements equivalent to all the other 
measures. Thus, their superior status as authorities disappeared under the dis-
cursive impact of the new super authority. This suspension of the former dis-
course structure (and, probably, institutional and ideological system of ne-
oliberalism as well) is finally confirmed via a bizarre statement, highlighted 
in purple: namely, that the collapse of the “former system” (EU-Maastricht-
neoliberal) will contribute to come back to this very structure when “eco-
nomic conditions allow”. Through this statement, the EU discourse seeks to 
mark, on the timeline, a state when the timeline itself would end, thereby es-
tablishing the new timeline of the new crisis discourse. This discourse strate-
gy allows us to conclude that a “state of economic exception” in the EU con-






3.3 The “hysteria” of technocracy 
 
Finally, the style of valuating economic entities and events has changed. 
While the typical evaluation modality of EU policy papers is characterised by 
a “smart” and “cautious” gesture, now a much more “dramatic” and even “hys-
teric” style can be found, as the excerpt below illustrates. 
 
 
Figure 9: from “distanced evaluation” to “emphatic investment” 
 
In Figure 9, I have underlined green those discursive markers (mainly adjec-
tives), which are used to evaluate economic entities (i.e. “global supply chains”, 
“jobs”) and related units (i.e. “citizens”). It is relatively conspicuous, even in times 
of crisis, to find relatively drastic evaluations such as “disrupting” or “threatening” 
in technical discourses. These sharp formulations make the image of a speaker 
visible that is getting distressed, is losing their way and their composure. The 
technocratic subject seems to fall into panic and becomes somehow “hysterical”. 
At the same time, the technocratic style of the entire discourse remains intact, 
but reaches to a certain limit. Here, again, the discourse is no longer formed by 
two conflicting authorities but is mainly controlled by a master signifier “crisis”, 
“pandemic” or “COVID-19”.  
 
 
Conclusion: the post-neoliberal “new normality” between old and new 
structures 
 
The aim of this paper was to show how a post-neoliberal order and discourse 
logic emerged through an external shock of the corona crisis in the realm of eco-
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nomic expert discourse. These traits of a post-neoliberal transformation do not 
imply that a future post-neoliberal economic and political order will be more so-
cially responsible, ecologically sustainable or will promote economic equality. It 
does neither mean that neoliberal politics will not come back when the end of 
crisis is somehow declared. Moreover, the corona crisis has the potential to pave 
the way to a society of control, paranoia and intensified exploitation, covering the 
global centres of capitalist production from the peripheral regions and handing 
over the latter to all sorts of climate, social and health catastrophes and violence. 
Yet, we nevertheless observe a couple of post-neoliberal transformations taking 
place at different levels, and the possible socio-economic consequences of these 
transformations are not yet clear.  
In Table 1, Section 1, I have distinguished four levels of the neoliberal eco-
nomic dispositif: 1) Europe as a world economy, 2) institutions, 3) net-
works/policy ideas and 4) discourses. The post-neoliberal change appeared, first of 
all, on the level of economic policy ideas (3), predominantly through the suspen-
sion of the Maastricht deficit criteria as well as through the many European fiscal 
packages that were set up to manage the crisis since March 2020. Both measures 
were not made in the financial crisis since 2009 and both were unthinkable be-
fore March 2020. After the gradually successful management of the Euro crisis, 
the EU seemed to move back to the old pathway of neoliberal fiscal management. 
Now, we see a 180-degree turnaround in economic policy, resorting to more or 
less classical Keynesian ideas such as public investments, stimulus measures, job 
market protection policies and social programmes. This shift away from neoliber-
alism cannot only be experienced on the level of economic policy (Table 1, 3). As 
the discourse analysis of two documents from the European Semester 2020 have 
shown, the corona pandemic has clearly changed the neoliberal discourse struc-
tures in Europe (Table 1, 4). As Table 2 shows, almost all main structural elements 
characterising EU neoliberalism in policy documents have changed. 
 
 






New  Crisis deixis  Master signifier Hysteria 






In addition to transformations on the discursive level of European Semes-
ter documents, the institutional logic (Table 1, 2) of the European Semester 
also changed. First, it changed by modifying the process between the Country 
Report and the Recommendation as well as by the suspension of the Maas-
tricht Criteria. Second, the process structure of the European Semester 2021 
cycle also changed due to corona, as the European Commission illustrates 
with Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: old and new European Semester process structure  
(Source: EU Commission webpage) 26 
 
As we easily can see, the intervention of the master signifier “COVID-19” 
has reduced neoliberal influences on three levels: the network/idea level, the 
institutional level and the discursive level.  
But what is happening on the level of the world economy? Will the coro-
na shock also push back the economic hierarchy, forming a field of economic 
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winners and losers of decade-long neoliberal reforms? This is clearly not the 
case. On the contrary, as accessible data to date indicate27, corona will even 
increase the already existing inequalities and power asymmetries between re-
gions, classes and sectors. Three sorts of data illustrate this. Those countries 
and regions that profited, in the past, over long periods from EU neoliberal-
ism, now experience lower GDP losses (Germany); and countries from the 
south of Europe which are in crisis for a long time and which were hit dra-
matically by the Euro crisis 2009 (Greece, Italy, Spain) experience compara-
tively high GDP losses. In addition to that, Germany was able to mobilise 
much more money in order to fight the economic consequences of the corona 
crisis, as Figure 11 shows. 
 
 
Figure 11: economic measures to fight corona crisis (source: Bruegel28) 
 
If we just look at the four biggest EU economies accounting for around 
80% of EU GDP, Germany spend much more than France, Italy and Spain. 
Finally, those economic sectors, which are very important for the economies 
in the south such as tourism and related sectors, are much more hidden by 
the corona crisis than the industries that are very strong in north-western and 
                                                 
27 January 2020 





eastern countries. In addition to that, most precarious workers are appointed 
in those sectors that are strongly hit by the crisis. This means that the income 
gap between the upper-middle classes and the lower middle-classes will in-
crease by the crisis (not to speak about shareholders who profited mostly 
from the corona crash at the financial markets!).  
All these data support the presumption that the corona crisis will intensify 
existing inequalities caused by neoliberal politics of the last decades. Thus, the 
post-neoliberal “new normality” appears, for the moment, as a paradox state of 
affairs. While the short-term related neoliberal traits almost disappeared, the 
long-term consequences of neoliberal politics are manifested because they are 
deeply anchored in the structures of the European world economy. Transfor-
mations on this level would require strong European solidarity between the re-
gions, the countries and the middle and precarious classes, new directions of 
European economic policies and a sustainable transformation of the European 
economy. For the moment, only very weak and vague structural tendencies are 
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